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CONTRACTS OF ADHESION UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW
Contracts between parties of unequal bargaining strength are becoming
more common in the mid-twentieth century than ever before. Over recent
decades, businesses have grown in both size and relative market domina-
tion in many fields of commerce. While the small businessman has not dis-
appeared, in many segments of our economy he is at least dominated by
big business. This development in modern society was the theme of a
recent speech delivered by California Supreme Court Associate Justice
Mathew Tobriner. He summed up the trend as follows:
* . . As society has become more complex, it has become more institu-
tionalized, not only in government, but in private groups-in the cor-
poration, the labor union, the agricultural cooperative, the medical
society, the insurance company and the public utility. ... The mannerof organization may range from the monolith of the corporation to the
losse and scattered confederacy of landlords. But in all these organiza-
tions there runs a common factor: an individual's needs and interest
depend more and more upon the control of these dominant groups.'
The analysis which follows will concentrate upon one important facet of
big business with which the California courts have been confronted-con-
tracts of adhesion. Such contracts, often in the guise of standardized
forms, are being offered to society by many firms dealing in necessary
products or services in such a quantity that they have become substan-
tially (if not totally) immune from the pressures of the bargaining table.
The dangers of standardized contracts today have been strongly de-
scribed in the following terms: "Standard contracts.. . could thus become
effective instruments in the hands of powerful industrial and commercial
overlords enabling them to impose a new feudal order of their own making
upon a vast host of vassals." 2 The term "contract of adhesion" refers to a
contract not formulated as a result of the give-and-take of bargaining
where the desires of one party are balanced by those of the other. But
instead, due to the basic inequality of bargaining position, the customer,
by entering the transaction, is forced to "adhere" to the terms presented
by the stronger party; only a very few items may be open to his determin-
ation.' A standard contract of adhesion is simply a contract which is
drafted by the party of superior bargaining power and is used exclusively
in all dealings with the product or service he offers. The contract is
printed in great numbers, and the agent with whom the weaker party deals
has little or no authority to alter the printed terms of the "bargain."
1 Address by Hon. Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner, Associate Justice, California Supreme
Court, Inglewood Bar Association, April 1, 1964.
2 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM.
L. REV. 629, 640 (1943).
3 Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative Study in
the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUI. L. REV. 481 (1961-1962).
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It should not be concluded that standard contracts are in all cases
undesirable.
Mass production of contracts, like mass production of goods, may serve
the interests of all parties. Among the advantages claimed for the use
of standard form contracts are these: it takes advantage of the lessons
of experience and enables a judicial interpretation of one contract to
serve as an interpretation of all contracts; it reduces uncertainty and
saves time and trouble; it simplifies planning and makes the skill of the
draftsman available to all personnel; it makes risks calculable and "in-creases that real security which is the necessary basis of initiative and
the assumption of foreseeable risks." 4
While the pioneer literature on this subject was written in the 1940's,5
judicial recognition of "adhesion contracts" has been slow to take hold.
Until quite recently the statutes and cases in California attempted to reach
what the court feels to be the "just" result in each individual situation,
rather than looking at the problem as a whole, in general terms, as a part
of general contract law.
American law has developed a variety of judicial techniques to restrain
the prophylactic draftsman: (1) exculpatory clauses are strictly con-
strued; (2) exculpatory clauses in contracts "effected with a public in-
terest" may be void as against public policy; (3) "unconscionable"
clauses are unenforceable; and (4) clauses in derogation of normal
venue or jurisdictional provisions must satisfy special, though uncertain,
criteria.6
The inevitable judicial recognition of contracts of adhesion as a doctrine
in itself occurred in 1960 in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,' a
decision already accepted as a leading case in tort and contract law.
(Hereinafter, the terms "adhesion doctrine" and "doctrine of adhesion"
will be used to indicate the rationale that was applied in Henningsen,
namely, that the superior party will not be permitted to rely upon the
contract clause in issue.) In the Henningsen case the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the disclaimer found in virtually all contracts for the
sale of new automobiles would not protect either the manufacturer, or the
dealer who actually contracts with the purchaser from a suit for personal
injury caused by a defective automobile. The Court observed that all of
the major automobile manufacturers in the United States, as members of
the Automobile Manufacturers Association, use a uniform disclaimer
clause. Neither the manufacturer nor the dealer, the Court reasoned,
4 JONES, FARNSWORTH & YOUNG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 150 (1965).
5 Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLuM.
L. REv. 629 (1943).
6 Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50 VA. L. REV.
1179, 1187 (1964).
7 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
8 Id. at 87.
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should be allowed to use its grossly disproportionate bargaining power to
relieve itself from liability and to impose on the ordinary buyer (who in
effect has no real freedom of choice when it comes to allocating the risk of
loss for injury) the grave danger of injury to himself and others that at-
tends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality as a defectively made
automobile. The Court set forth its attitude toward such disclaimers in
the following manner:
The task of the judiciary is to administer the spirit as well as the letter
of the law. On issues such as the present one, part of the burden is to
protect the ordinary man against the loss of important rights through
what, in effect, is the unilateral act of the manufacturer. The status of
the automobile industry is unique. Manufacturers are few in number
and strong in bargaining position. In the matter of warranties on the
sale of their products, the Automobile Manufacturers Association has
enabled them to present a united front. From the standpoint of the pur-
chaser, there can be no arms length negotiating on the subject. Because
his capacity for bargaining is so grossly unequal, the inexorable conclu-
sion which follows is that he is not permitted to bargain at all. He must
take or leave the automobile on the warranty terms dictated by the
maker. He cannot turn to a competitor for better security. 9 [Emphasis
added.]
The California courts adopted this attitude in two steps. In Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,'0 a broad pronouncement of the existence of
public policy disallowing warranty disclaimers was made. Henceforth in
California no manufacturer of a product of such a nature that it will be
placed into use by the purchaser without inspection for defects, will be per-
mitted to hide behind a disclaimer of liability for injury to life or limb.
The California courts will hold the manufacturer strictly liable in tort and
will not permit a shifting of the risk under the contract of sale. The tenor
of this decision was based upon the theory of product liability.
In Vandermark v. Ford Motor Company" the second step was taken.
Here the attempted shift of risk from manufacturer to consumer was dis-
cussed both in terms of strict liability in tort and on the basis of the adhe-
sion doctrine, which, as the Henningsen court had found, was applicable
to the standard warranty clause used in the contract of sale. Behind this
policy of non-recognition of the disclaimer is a general recognition that
9 Id. at 94.
10 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697 (1963).
11 34 Cal.Rptr. 723 (Cal.App. 1963). The California Supreme Court affirmed the decision
regarding liability of the manufacturer, basing its decision on strict liability in tort, 61 Cal.2d
256, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896 (1964). The District Court of Appeal decision was based in part on the
adhesion doctrine, which the Supreme Court found unnecessary, since the same result could
be more easily reached on strict liability grounds. The District Court of Appeal opinion is
included here since its reasoning as regards the adhesion doctrine is applicable as part of gen-
eral contract law as discussed in the following cases.
[Vol. 1
manufacturers are in a far stronger bargaining position than the con-
sumer. To allow the strong party to shift the risk of loss would place the
weak party at the former's mercy.
The Henningsen view of contracts of adhesion, however, is not limited
to the sale of goods. While it is too soon to determine just how far-reaching
the adhesion theory will become, a study of various areas of the law may
be suggestive. The problem of inequality of bargaining power has been
before the courts for years and will undoubtedly become even more fre-
quent in a society where business firms are becoming larger and larger.
Often the courts can find an ambiguity in the contract and thereby
construe the offending clause against the superior party, as was done in a
telegraph company case in 1912,12 where the Court used virtually identical
reasoning as is applied today to contracts of adhesion.
These contracts are prepared by the telegraph company and printed
upon all of its blanks provided for the use of the public. They are not
often the result of negotiation between the parties. The sender has no
choice, nor any reasonable opportunity to make terms not specified in
the printed contract .... 13
An excellent contemporary discussion of the field of adhesion contracts is
found in Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,4 where the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court squarely based its decision on the adhesion doc-
trine. In this case, a patient entered University of California at Los An-
geles Hospital and was required to release the hospital from all liability
except that arising from the negligent hiring of employees. The Court held
that such a release was void as against public policy under California
Civil Code §1668,'5 on the basis of a finding that the contract was one of
adhesion. The adhesion doctrine, the Court noted, was part and parcel of
general public policy. Under such an interpretation of public policy,
adhesion contracts can be decided squarely on the basis of §1668. The
Court listed what falls within the "public interest":
In placing particular contracts within or without the category of those
affected with a public interest, the courts have revealed a rough outline
of that type of transaction in which exculpatory provisions will be held
invalid. Thus the attempted but invalid exemption involves a transac-
tion which exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It con-
cerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regula-
12 Union Construction Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 163 Cal. 298, 125 P. 242
(1912).
13 Id. at 315, 125 P. at 248.
1460 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963).
15 CAL. CIv. CODE §1668: "All contracts which have for their object, directly or indirectly,
to exempt any one from responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person or
property of another, or violation of law, whether willful or negligent, are against the policy of
the law."
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tion. The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service
of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. * * * As a result of the essen-
tial nature of the service, in the economic setting of the transaction, the
party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining
strength against any member of the public who seeks his services. In
exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public
with a standardized contract of exculpation, and makes no provision
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain
protection against negligence.16 [Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.]
This case, reviewing most of the important California decisions in which
the adhesion doctrine could come into play, promises to be an excellent
guide for the future. Using §1668, the California courts will now hold that
when a contract affects the "public interest," California public policy re-
quires that its adhesive portions be ineffectual in insulating the stronger
party.
Having looked at the adhesion doctrine in general terms, this analysis
will now turn to several specific fields of contract law. The selection of the
fields of law discussed below is by no means exclusive. The areas of con-
tract to be investigated were chosen here as a survey of some of the more
commonly found situations where the doctrine of adhesion might apply.
INSURANCE
One of the most fundamental rules which is applied in California when
the courts are faced with the problem of interpreting a contract of insur-
ance is that an insurance policy must be strictly construed against the
party who drafted the instrument. 1'7 Usually this rule is applied where the
contract is ambiguous in one of its clauses. However, it is important to
note that an actual ambiguity is not always necessary. Where the Court
concludes that justice between the parties requires a construction not
clearly indicated from the words of the contract, it may judicially "inter-
pret" against the insurer even absent an ambiguity. Such was the case in
Raulet v. Northwestern National Insurance Company 8 where a clearly
phrased insurance contract stated that the insurer would not be contract-
ually liable if the insured suffered loss or destruction of personal property
if such property was encumbered. The property in issue was indeed en-
cumbered with a chattel mortgage. While the Court realized that it was
proper for the insurer to limit its exposure to certain specified risks, it
looked behind the characterization of the risk and concluded that since
the chattel mortgage was small in relation to the value of the personalty it
16 Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 98, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33, 36
(1963).
17 Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N. Y., 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 (1962).
18 157 Cal. 213, 107 P. 292 (1910).
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did not "encumber" the chattel or substantially change the risk of loss.
Thus the Court expansively interpreted the word "encumbrance", in effect
adding a modification to the word (substantial) to come to a result con-
trary to the terms of the contract. The underlying reason for this change
was justice between the parties.
But, in reaching "justice between the parties" the court will not always
construe the contract against the insurer. Where justice requires, the
court will enforce the strict wording of the contract. In 1962 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, recognizing that it must construe ambiguities
against the insurer, and that insurance contracts were contracts of adhe-
sion, nevertheless refused to "interpret" where it felt it best not to do so.
Thus, ".... while we are sensitive to the plight of the assured who is con-
fronted by multiple and complex clauses of insurance, [citation], never-
theless we are bound by the language of a contract which is itself clear
and unchallengable." 19 The Court held that a clause which automatically
incorporated any statutory requirement did not include a statutory inclu-
sion of uninsured motorist insurance which was to be required on all
policies of insurance, since the policy in question had been issued prior to
the enactment of the statute. The Court did not feel it proper to increase
the risk of loss on a policy already in force. Justice here favored the
insurer.
During the same year, the Court had occasion to look again at con-
tracts of insurance, and the policy discussed above was clearly affirmed.
Here, however, the balance was struck in favor of the insured. In this case,
Steven v. Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y.,2  a truly classic example of an
adhesion contract was involved. The insured had purchased a trip insur-
ance policy from a vending machine located in an airport. The policy was
several pages long with the small print that is often found in contracts of
insurance. The insurer specifically conditioned liability upon the suffering
of loss while en route on a scheduled airline. The insured had no way of
reading such condition until he paid for the policy, at which time the "con-
tract" emerged from the faceless machine. Further, he was instructed to
mail the policy to the beneficiary, which he did, and there was no showing
that he was given a copy to retain. When faced with the necessity of find-
ing alternate transportation at a stopover, the insured chose a non-sched-
uled airline, which was a reasonable choice under the circumstances. This
non-scheduled airplane crashed, killing the insured. When the beneficiary
sued for the proceeds of the insurance policy, the insurer asserted the de-
fense of failure of condition. The Court, emphasizing the inequality of
bargaining power, said,
19 Ball v. California State Automobile Inter-Insurance Bureau, 201 Cal.App.2d 85, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 31, 33 (1962).
20 58 Cal.2d 862, 27 Cal.Rptr. 172 (1962).
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In standardized contracts, such as the instant one, which are made by
parties of unequal bargaining strength, the California courts have long
been disinclined to effectuate clauses of limitation of liability which are
unclear, unexpected, inconspicuous, or unconscionable. The attitude of
the courts has been manifested in many areas of contract. 2 1
And,
We examine the question in light of the purpose and intent of the
parties in entering into the contract, Mr. Steven's knowledge and under-
standing as a reasonable layman, his normal expectation of the extent
of coverage of the policy and the effect, if any, of the substitution of the
transportation upon the risk of the insurer.22
Thus, it is clear that henceforth insurance contracts will be viewed in light
of the "reasonable expectation of the parties." Clauses which the insured
might not expect to find in such a policy which would limit the effect of the
policy will not be effective unless, of course, the limitation is clearly pointed
out at the time of execution of the contract. Further, the Steven case said
that where the limitation proves to be "unconscionable," even if the in-
sured has notice, the limitation will be without effect. In the Steven case,
of course, this statement was mere dicta, since the decision rested pri-
marily on the fact that the insured was not shown to have known of the
condition in question, but the sentiment was quite strongly expressed, and
will undoubtedly serve as a guideline for future decisions where a clearly
understood, but unconscionable clause is encountered. This result seems
inescapable, as part of the development of the adhesion doctrine now being
squarely incorporated into California public policy.
Insurance contracts are likely to be challenged quite frequently as
standard contracts of adhesion because, while there may often be nego-
tiation as to how much the premium will be, and correspondingly, how
much protection will result from the insurance policy, most of the terms
simply are in the contract to stay. If the purchaser does not want them his
only choice is non-acceptance of the whole contract of insurance.
BAILMENT
In our modern society people often find it desirable or necessary to bail
their goods to one in the business of storing such goods. These professional
bailees prosper because they can usually care for goods more inexpensively
due to their specialization of function, and for the same reason, they can
often provide safer custody of the goods than could the owner. Thus,
bailee businesses such as parking lots, parcel checking rooms, warehouses,
etc., are both necessary and unavoidable. In many instances the bailor is
in no position to shop around for such services since there may be few
21 Id. at 879, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 183.
22 Id. at 869, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 176.
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bailees offering the service in the geographical area. Even where there is
competition among many bailees it is likely that they all take bailed goods
only on the same general terms. These bailees, then, fall into much the
same category as do the automobile dealers and manufacturers discussed
in Henningsen. They are able to force terms upon their clientele. Usually
the bailee desires to limit his liability for loss or damage to the bailed
goods, either by way of a dollar limitation or insulation in full for losses
from certain or all causes. The courts have long looked upon such limita-
tions with disfavor and have often held them unenforceable. Dieterle v.
Bekin3 was a case in which a fire destroyed goods worth $1,500. Plaintiff
claimed full damages and defendant asserted full exculpation under a
limitation in the standard form contract of bailment which disclaimed
liability for loss of goods from fire damage. The California Supreme
Court reversed a judgment for the defendant and remanded, instructing
the trial court to ignore the disclaimer and try the case solely on the issue
of defendant's negligence. In this early case no mention of public policy
was made by the court.
Subsequently a definite pattern emerged. In Northwestern Mut. Fire
Assn. v. Pacific Wharf & Storage24 it became clear that the Dieterle doc-
trine would not be blindly applied. When the warehouseman notified the
would-be bailor that the former could not be responsible for injury to
goods, due to an impending strike (union violence was apparently a
threat) the bailor was held to have assumed all risk of loss including loss
totally unrelated to the threatened strike when he nevertheless delivered
the goods to the bailee's wharf. Here, however, the decision reflected the
notion that public policy was the important issue to be resolved. The Court
held that the limitation of liability under the circumstances was simply
not contrary to public policy, the Court again looking to the policy of the
State to render justice between the parties.
Turning to the current state of the law in this field, three general rules
can be found to have evolved, stemming from the desire to effectuate
justice. First, if the bailee desires, he may, under certain circumstances,
limit his liability. He must clearly call it to the attention of the bailor.
Small print buried in the body of the contract will not serve as adequate
notice." If the bailee inserts a limitation by incorporation, using a standard
warehouse receipt, without calling the attention of the bailor to the limita-
tion, again the notice is insufficient to make the limitation effective."'
23 143 Cal. 683, 77 P. 664 (1904).
24 187 Cal. 38, 200 P. 934 (1921).
25 Wilson v. Crown Transfer & Storage Co., 201 Cal. 701, 258 P. 596 (1927).
26 Scott's Valley Fruit Exchange v. Growers Refrigerator Co., 81 Cal.App.2d 437, 184 P.2d
183 (1947).
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Where, however, the bailee conforms to the California Commercial Code I
he can insert in his receipt any terms and conditions which are not con-
trary to other provisions of the Code. This allows the bailee to limit his
liability even for negligence if he gives the bailor an option to obtain full-
value responsibility from the bailee, although such liability may be con-
ditioned upon the payment of a higher fee." Here again, the limitation and
option must be clearly pointed out to the bailor.
Second, it is important to notice an "interpretation" doctrine which
comes into play in this area (as it also does in insurance contracts) which
is a product of long standing judicial philosophy. While a party may ab-
solve himself from liability if this is not discountenanced by public policy
or some other statutory inhibition, the courts will still look at the dis-
claimer with disfavor when it has the effect of exempting one from his
liability due to negligence (rather than a mere shifting of risk if neither
party be at fault). The courts also often conclude that, in absence of con-
sideration given to compensate for the shifting of the risk of loss, public
policy requires liability for damages resulting from one's own negligence. 9
The court will usually construe such provisions strictly against the person
relying upon them, especially where that person is the author of the docu-
ment." It thus becomes extremely important for draftsmen of standard
contracts of bailment (as well as other types of contracts) to make such
clauses clear, and to call the bailor's attention to them.
Third, where the bailee is a public warehouseman he is now classed in
California as a public utility and must comply with the numerous regula-
tions found in the Public Utilities Code.3 Thus, if he files his tariff with
the appropriate commission and draws attention adequately to such tariff,
the bailor will be bound by the terms even if he refuses to read the limita-
tion of liability. 2 However, the California Commercial Code §7204,
which is similar in this respect to the Warehouseman Act 31 which it dis-
placed, requires the warehouseman to be answerable for his own negli-
gence. Here there is a clear statutory expression of public policy upon
which the courts can and do ignore such limitations upon liability.34
Perhaps the best view of the position the courts are currently taking
when faced with limited liability bailment contracts in cases where there
27 CAL. COMM. CODE §7402.
28 Ibid.
29 Dieterle v. Bekin, 143 Cal. 683, 77 P. 664 (1904).
30 Sproul v. Cuddy, 131 Cal.App.2d 85, 280 P.2d 158 (1955).
31 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§216, 219.
32 Hischemoeller v. National Ice & Cold Storage Co., 46 Cal.2d 318, 294 P.2d 433 (1956).
83 Section 21, adopted as part of CAL. CIv. CODE §1858.30.
84 England v. Lyon Fireproof Storage Co., 94 Cal.App. 562, 271 P. 532 (1928). See also
CAL. CIV. CODE §1668.
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is no controlling statute can be found in the two cases below. In a 1963
case,"s the City of Los Angeles attempted to shift all liability from dam-
ages from any source whatever to the bailor. The city was operating, in a
proprietary capacity, a cargo dump at the wharf. The Court (following
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California"6) stated that: "In view of
the dominant bargaining position of the city with respect to those who,
because of the nature of their business, must make use of harbor facilities
of the kind here involved, the conclusion.., appears to be compelled..."
that the plaintiff recover damages resulting from the city's negligence,
depite the waiver of liability clause in the contract." The language quoted
above clearly indicates that the basis of the decision is the adhesion doc-
trine.
The second case, Constantian v. Mercedes Benz, 35 is an example of an"arms-length" transaction of parties of relatively equal bargaining
strength. An automobile agency rented a rug for its showroom from the
bailor and was contractually liable for any damages from any source. Here
the bailment was not of the usual sort discussed above in that the bailor by
contract wanted to shift the risk of all loss to the bailee; the principles
involved are, however, the same. This is often the situation when a party
rents or leases personal property. It is important to note that in Constan-
tian the party who was "forced" to assume the risk of loss was not a weak
party when compared to the bailor. Further, the placing of all risk on the
party in possession of the goods is quite reasonable and is not at all op-
pressive. The Henningsen adhesion doctrine therefore does not require this
type of contract to be held ineffectual, because of the relative equality of
bargaining position, and the lack of necessity to take or leave the contract
as a whole, with any offending terms forced upon an unwilling party. The
party taking the risk could have looked elsewhere to satisfy his needs, or
could have easily insured the property, the insurance premiums being no
more than a normal, reasonable business expense. The cases, then, re-
volved around the consideration of justice between the parties. Only when
the adhesion doctrine is applicable will the courts hold the attempted shift-
35 E. B. Ackerman Importing Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.Rptr. 243 (1963) ; vacated
61 Cal.2d 595, 39 Cal.Rptr. 726 (1964). Upon hearing the case, the California Supreme Court
reversed and remanded, with instructions for the trial court to stay the proceedings until a
determination as to the effect of the exculpatory clause as determined by the Federal Maritime
Commission, which the Court felt had primary jurisdiction over the case. It was felt that the
Commission would be the best party to determine whether or not the exculpatory clause was
reasonable and justified based upon the rates charged, etc. However, the theory behind the
original decision discussed in the text would appear still to apply: if the exculpation is unrea-
sonable, it would not be enforced, due to the finding that the contract was adhesive.36 Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963).
37 E. B. Ackerman Importing Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 33 Cal.Rptr. 243, 245 (1963).
38 5 Cal.2d 631, 55 P.2d 841 (1936).
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ing of liability ineffectual, unless of course, some other policy makes the
provision objectionable.
Contracts of shipment or personal carriage fall into similar categories
as do the general contracts of bailment discussed above. Here, as in the
bailment situation, carriers cannot limit their liability for damages which
result from their own negligence even if such limitation is filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission unless the shipper or passenger is given
an option to receive full protection (though at a higher cost)." However,
if the federal government does in any particular situation declare that the
shipper or passenger is bound even if there is no option, then of course,
under the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution ° the national
public policy would take precedence over the state's public policy against
adhesion contracts. It is held that any such limitation of liability must be
the result of free and fair negotiation between the parties and must of
course be reasonable."
The cases noted in the footnotes to the preceding paragraph do not
mention "adhesion" contracts. But the principles of the adhesion doctrine,
it is suggested, would lead to the same results. It would seem that unless
there is federal authority for such, no carrier will be permitted to force a
shipper or passenger to adhere to unreasonable limitations of liability on
a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. And, in drawing an analogy to the Constan-
tian case, the courts might enforce a contract between a carrier and a
large corporation offering a large volume of business to the carrier, while
the same clause would be held ineffectual if a housewife or a small mer-
chant were the party contracting with the carrier.
Thus, bailment contracts, while often subject to rules of law peculiar
to that field, still would seem to fit into the general scheme of the adhe-
sion doctrine just as easily as insurance contracts or contracts for the sale
of goods, the subject of the next section.
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS
As noted above,42 under California law all manufacturers of standard
products used by consumers will be held strictly liable in tort for damages
to person or property which result from a defect in the product, and such
manufacturer will not be permitted to exculpate itself from such liability
contractually." The doctrine of adhesion contracts is not, however, limited
to such attempts at exculpation. Although the question is not likely to
appear in the case of product liability now that California has indicated
39 Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 936 (1928); Hubbard v. Matson
Nay. Co., 34 Cal.App.2d 475, 93 P.2d 846 (1943).
40 U. S. CONST. art. VI.
41 McQueen v. Tyler, 61 Cal.App.2d 263, 142 P.2d 466 (1943).
42 See text accompanying notes 10 and 11.
43 See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, §402A (1965).
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that such cases will be decided on the basis of strict liability, an occasional
case undoubtedly will arise where other matters in the contract are ad-
hesive. One such case was decided in 1964. In Walnut Creek Pipe Distrib-
utors, Inc., v. Gates Rubber Sales Division44 the court squarely met the
question of adhesion and quite reasonably concluded that the contract was
not adhesive. Here the distributor contested the manufacturer's contract
right to cancel a distributorship agreement alleging that the cancellation
clause was forced, unfairly, upon the jobber. The Court held that the con-
tract was not adhesive on the basis that there was no showing that the
goods in question could be purchased only from the defendant, and fur-
ther, that there was no evidence introduced that would tend to show that
the parties were not bargaining as equals. The plaintiff was urging that as
a matter of law, merely because the contract was one of "distributorship,"
a presumption should be raised to the effect that the manufacturer had
the upper hand at the bargaining table. In another case, Ury v. Jewelers
Acceptance Corporation,5 the issue of adhesion was again raised in a con-
tract for the sale of goods. Here the court held that due to a showing of
extensive negotiation, it was apparent that the contract was not one of ad-
hesion. Thus, while the two cases concluded that the cofitracts under re-
view were not the result of "bargaining" between the strong and the weak,
it seems clear that the issue is now being openly decided by the courts,
and it is suggsted that when the facts do arise where the parties are sub-
stantially unequal in position, the courts will meet the issue squarely on
the basis of the adhesion theory and will strike the offending clause, to ar-
rive at justice between the parties.
LANDLORD-TENANT
While as yet there'have been no cases in California holding a lease con-
tract adhesive as such, this field of law is a fertile one for the growth of the
doctrine. As early as 1895 the California Supreme Court discussed the
equality of bargaining power of the parties to a lease agreement.46 In that
case the lessor, a railroad, disclaimed liability, placing the risk of all loss,
including fire, on the lessee. A fire caused by the negligence of the lessor's
employees destroyed the tenant's property. The Court examined the con-
tract from the standpoint of both public policy and equality of bargaining.
Since the plaintiff's property was not too large, the Court concluded that
shifting of the risk of loss in this one small geographical area would not
have the effect of lowering the railroads normal exercise of care (which
was required as a matter of public interest). This brought the Court to the
issue of adhesion, though the current terminology was not used. The
44 228 Cal.App.2d 810, 39 Cal.Rptr. 767 (1964).
45 227 Cal.App.2d 11, 38 Cal.Rptr. 376 (1964).
46 Stephens v. Southern Pacific Co., 109 Cal. 86, 41 P. 783 (1895).
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parties were found to have stood on common ground dealing ". . . with
each other as A. and B. might deal with each other with reference to any
private business undertaking." 47 Thus, the shifting of the risk of loss was
allowed, and the railroad was allowed to fully exculpate itself from lia-
bility resulting from its own negligence.
Two interesting cases arose in the early 1950's. In both cases the lessor
attempted to completely exculpate himself from liability for any and all
tort damages which might subsequently arise. Both cases involved "aggra-
vated" or affirmative negligence, where the landlord refused to correct
known defects over a long period of time; such defects caused, in the first
case, substantial property damage,4" and in the second, constructive evic-
tion.49 Both cases held that the limitation of liability should be interpreted
to include only "passive" negligence, such being the "presumed intent" of
the parties. Here, clearly, we find the court changing the terms of the con-
tract (as is done in insurance contracts, discussed supra) in order to reach
what the court felt was the just result. Perhaps the adhesion theory would
have served well in coming to the same conclusion, allowing the court to
meet the issue squarely without "interpreting" a contract which is clear in
the first place.
In the case of Inglis v. Garland 5 the view that leases were matters of
private contract was clearly enunciated.
We think it is the law that "a lease is a matter of private contract be-
tween the lessor and the lessee with which the general public is not con-cerned. And if they see fit to contract that the lessor shall not be liable
for damages resulting from his negligence or the negligence of his em-
ployees, the law permits him to do so; and the courts must give effect
to and enforce such contracts." 51
This statement of the law was repeated with approval in Mills v. Rup-
pert,5" a 1959 case. As in the Inglis case, the facts called for such a conclu-
sion. The Court looked to the relative position of the parties. This lease-
hold was not a normal residential estate, but one of a rental of a motel. As
noted by the trial judge, "Mrs. Mills is undoubtedly an excellent business
manager and motel operator. (The day she signed this lease must have
been one of her off days.)" "' Thus it would appear that the Inglis rationale
may not be applicable in all cases, since the Court is now inquiring more
deeply into what was previously accepted as a matter of private concern.
It is here suggested that today's standard residential lease, which is used
47 Id. at 88, 41 P. at 784.
48 Butt v. Bertola, 110 Cal.App.2d 128, 242 P.2d 32 (1952).
49 Barkett v. Brucata, 122 Cal.App.2d 264, 264 P.2d 978 (1953).
50 19 Cal.App.2d 767, 64 P.2d 501 (1936).
r1 Id. at 773, 64 P.2d at 504.
52167 Cal.App.2d 58, 333 P.2d 818 (1959).
M Id. at 64, 333 P.2d at 821.
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by virtually all landlords and real estate management firms, should indeed
be held, in some cases, to be adhesive. Often the would-be tenant, in going
from building to building in search of a home or apartment, is faced with
the same standard lease form with no opportunity to bargain its limita-
tions out of the contract. Such leases usually include a waiver of statutory
rights 4 (often referred to only by reference, so that the tenant generally
has no idea just what he has waived). Since the adhesion doctrine is be-
coming implanted in California, it is seemingly only a matter of time be-
fore it is applied to this field. Where the question involves a waiver of
rights under the Civil Code, 5 an appellate case is unlikely to arise simply
because the amount involved is limited by the statute itself. However,
where the question involves a release of liability for tort damages, the
amount of damages in question may be substantial, offering incentive to
test the effectiveness of the waiver of liability. Perhaps when the two issues
come to an appellate court at the same time the problem will be resolved
in favor of the weaker party, the tenant, in both instances. However, this
has not as yet been enunciated by the courts, and thus the current state of
the law in California remains, nominally at least, as it did in 1936 as
shown in the Inglis case.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this comment has been to point out some of the dangers
present in those contracts which fall into the pattern described in Tunkl.5"
It is clear that a contract need not be standardized to qualify as an adhe-
sion contract. However, it would seem that if it is standardized, the court
may more readily find it to have been imposed on a take-it-or-leave-it
basis. Parties who offer such contracts to the public should be aware that
such contracts, where oppressive, are less likely to be accepted by the
courts of this State. It would seem to be in the best interests of the client
that the attorney who actually drafts such contracts makes it clear to the
client that any potentially oppressive clause be clearly pointed out to the
54 CAL. CIV. CODE §§1941, 1942. Section 1941 provides: "The lessor of a building intended
for the occupation of human beings must, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary,
put it into a condition fit for such occupation, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof,
which render it untenantable .. " Section 1942 provides: "If within a reasonable time after
notice to lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may
repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater
than one month's rent on the premises, and deduct the expenses of such repairs from the rent,
or the lessee may vacate the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from further pay-
ment of rent, or performance of other conditions." These provisions certainly constitute valu-
able rights to the lessee. While the waiver of them is not forbidden in the Code, it is suggested
that a forced waiver is arguably oppressive, subject to the general arguments in favor of non-
enforcement of the waiver under the adhesion doctrine.
55 Ibid.
56 Tunki v. Regents of University of California, 60 Cal.2d 92, 32 Cal.Rptr. 33 (1963).
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offeree. Further, it seems wise, where possible, that the offeree be encour-
aged to negotiate concerning such matters, with a reasonable opportunity
to bargain the clause out of the contract, perhaps in return for higher con-
sideration on his part, since even where the weaker party has notice, the
clause still may be striken where justice requires this. Perhaps this could
be done in many situations by allowing the offeree to pay additional con-
sideration in an amount related to the premium an insurance company
might charge for protection in such a case. Whatever method is found
most applicable under the circumstances, it would seem that some adap-
tation to the current philosophy of the courts, that the individual in
today's society must be protected from the strong businessman, if neces-
sary.
Clearly it is economically impractical to abandon the use of standard-
ized contracts. Such contracts serve a useful purpose in both facilitating
and lowering costs of the large volume of business being conducted in
America. Standard leases, bailment contracts, product warranties, insur-
ance policies, bankbooks, conditional sales contracts, standard promissory
notes, confession of judgment contracts and many other such contracts
have simply become part of the contemporary community. However, those
fortunate enough to have attained a position in the community which en-
ables them to "dictate" to the remainder of society, regarding the terms
and conditions under which the average citizen may obtain those products
and services necessary for comfortable living must use more self-restraint
in the future. If they do not, they will soon find themselves on the losing
side of an increasing amount of litigation.
In each of the separate topics discussed in this analysis the adhesion
doctrine is, or could in the future be, found to be applicable. The courts
will not look only to legislative protections geared to protect weak mem-
bers of society (as it has in usurous situations and contracts with minors,
for example) but will continue to find new fields in which its protection
is needed. It seems clear that the expression and the philosophy behind the
adhesion doctrine will become an increasingly important part of contract
law within a very short time. Steven Louis Saxe
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